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NOTES
CIVIL PROCEDURE-RULE 42(b)-BIFURCATION OF THE ISSUES
OF LIABILITY AND DAMAGES AT TRIAL. Hunter v. McDaniel Broth-
ers Construction Co., 274 Ark. 178, 623 S.W.2d 196 (1981).
Michael Crosno was killed and Pattie Jean Crosno injured
when their pickup truck collided with a mobile home in tow behind
a tractor-truck operated by an employee of McDaniel Brothers Con-
struction Company. Pattie Jean Crosno was a passenger in the pick-
up truck. A personal injury action was filed on behalf of Pattie Jean
Crosno, a minor, by her mother, Patty Crosno Hunter. Richard
Alan Crosno joined a wrongful death claim for the estate of Michael
Crosno in this action.
The trial court, on its own motion, and over the objections of
the plaintiffs, ordered a bifurcated trial on the issues of liability and
damages, with the issue of liability to be tried first. The trial court
relied upon rule 42(b)' of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure for
its authority to order the bifurcation. The jury returned a verdict of
no liability and thus did not reach the issue of damages.
The plaintiffs, on appeal, contended that the bifurcation of the
issues of liability and damages deprived them of the right to a jury
trial, as guaranteed by the Arkansas Constitution2 and rule 38 of the
Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure.3 They argued in the alternative
that if rule 42(b) did permit such a bifurcation, the trial court
abused its discretion by applying the rule to plaintiffs' case.
After noting that the bifurcation procedure in question
presented an issue of first impression, the Arkansas Supreme Court
1. ARK. R. Civ. P. 42(b) provides:
The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate
trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of
any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim or third-party claim, or of any separate issue
or any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues.
2. ARK. CONST. art. II, § 7, provides in pertinent part: "The right of trial by jury shall
remain inviolate, and shall extend to all cases at law, without regard to the amount in con-
troversy; but a jury trial may be waived by the parties in all cases in the manner prescribed
by law .... "
3. ARK. R. Civ. P. 38 provides in part: "Any party may demand a trial by jury of any
issue triable of right by a jury ....
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affirmed the lower court on both points. Hunter v. McDaniel Broth-
ers Construction Co., 274 Ark. 178, 623 S.W.2d 196 (1981).
Bifurcation of the issues of liability and damages did not exist
at common law.4 Specific statutory authority for the severance
procedure first appeared in rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, adopted in 1938. 5 It apparently was drafted as a re-
sponse to the liberal joinder rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure.6 Rule 42(b) was amended in 1966 to provide as follows:
The court in furtherance of convenience or to avoid
prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition
and economy, may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-
claim, counter-claim, or third-party claim, or of any separate is-
sue or of any number of claims, or issues, always preserving invi-
olate the right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh
Amendment to the Constitution or as given by a statute of the
United States.7
Prior to being used as authority for the bifurcation of liability
and damages in a personal injury action, rule 42(b) was used in a
variety of other contexts well suited for severance. For example,
separate trials have been ordered in cases involving issues such as
4. C. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF LAW OF THE CODE PLEADINGS § 73, at 472 (2d ed. 1947).
Cf. Mayers, The Severance for Trial of Liability from Damage, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 389, 396
(1938) (wh'le Mayers acknowledges a lack of case law supporting the right to bifurcate at
common law, he proposes that an inherent right to bifurcate existed at common law, but was
simply unexercised).
5. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b) provides: "The court, in furtherance of convenience or to
avoid prejudice . . . may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or
third-party claim, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counter-
claims, third-party claims, or issues."
6. See Collins v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1939); Note,
Separate Trial of a Claim or Issue in Modem Pleading." Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 39 MINN. L. REV. 743 (1955).
FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a) provides: "A party asserting a claim to relief as an original claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, may join, either as independent or as alter-
nate claims, as many claims, legal, equitable, or maritime, as he has against an opposing
party." In effect, this allows unlimited joinder of claims in order to expedite a determination
of the issues and to avoid delay and inconvenience. Confusion, however, sometimes results
from combining certain issues or claims. Rule 42(b) was drafted to prevent this. See Collins
v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 83, 85 (2d Cir. 1939).
7. The 1938 version of Rule 42(b) was amended by authorizing a separate trial "when
separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy," and by adding the provision
that begins with the words "always preserving." The purpose of the amendment was to
unify admiralty procedure and civil procedure. See 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2388, at 280 (1971).
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patent8 and copyright9 litigation; threshold issues such as jurisdic-
tion 10 and venue;'" and affirmative defenses such as statute of limi-
tations,1 2 laches,' 3 and validity of a release.'4 Thus it seems that use
of the device is a newcomer only in the area of personal injury
actions.
The federal courts have advanced many reasons for the adop-
tion of the severance concept. One such reason is to allow a simpli-
fied presentation of factual questions in complex cases. This
rationale was relied upon in one of the earliest cases involving sepa-
ration of issues in a personal injury action, Rickenbacher Transporta-
tion, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Railroad.'5  In Rickenbacher, the plaintiff's
truck, containing the shipments of thirty-five consignors, was hit by
the defendant's train. Since the damages question would have re-
quired detailed evidence from thirty-five out-of-state sources, the
court found it more practical to first determine the defendant's lia-
8. See, e.g., Woburn Degreasing Co. v. Spencer Kellogg & Sons, 37 F. Supp. 311
(W.D.N.Y. 1941). In defense of a patent infringement suit, the defendant asserted multiple
defenses, the least complicated of which was an asserted invalid patent. Upon the defend-
ant's motion, a separate trial was granted on the issue of validity. The trial court's separa-
tion of this issue was upheld on appeal on the basis of convenience and a potential time
savings.
9. See, e.g., Eisman v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 436 (S.D.N.Y. 1939). The
court remanded for trial only one of a number of issues, expressly finding under rule 42(b)
that this course was necessary and proper in order to further convenience and avoid delay.
10. See, e.g., Glaspell v. Davis, 2 F.R.D. 301 (D. Or. 1942). In a suit in which diversity
of citizenship was necessary to establish jurisdiction, the court held that the existence of
diversity was a threshold issue which deserved an early and separate determination under
rule 42(b).
11. See, e.g., Clark v. Lowden, 48 F. Supp. 261 (D. Minn. 1942), appeal dismissed, 135
F.2d 740 (8th Cir. 1943). In a FELA action brought in Minnesota, the defendant asserted
that the plaintiff was contractually bound to assert his claim in Illinois. The court appar-
ently utilized rule 42(b) and ordered a separate trial of this venue issue.
12. See, e.g., Seaboard Terminals Corp. v. Standard Oil Co., 30 F. Supp. 671 (S.D.N.Y.
1939). The defendants asserted a statute of limitations defense to a suit for injury to business
resulting from an alleged conspiracy of the defendants in violation of certain anti-trust laws.
Because this issue was potentially dispositive of the case, the court granted plaintiffs' request
for a separate trial, citing rule 42(b).
13. See, e.g., Greenspon v. Parke, Davis & Co., 8 F.R.D. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). The
defendant moved for a separate trial on its defense of laches. The court held that while such
was authorized by rule 42(b), the motion was untimely filed and would not result in a sav-
ings of time because the proof necessary to resolve this issue was the same as that necessary
to resolve issues raised by the plaintiffs complaint.
14. See, e.g., Bedser v. Horton Motor Lines, Inc., 122 F.2d 406 (4th Cir. 1941). In this
personal injury action, the defendant asserted a prior release executed by the plaintiff as a
bar to the plaintiffs claim. The court, citing rule 42(b), granted the defendant's motion for a
separate trial on this issue over the plaintiffs objection and found that no prejudice resulted
to the plaintiff because of the separate trial.
15. 3 F.R.D. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 5:405
bility.' 6 One of the more often cited cases, In re Texas City Disaster
Litigation,7 used this same reasoning to justify bifurcation. This
case involved 273 suits by 8,485 plaintiffs seeking damages totalling
approximately $200,000,000. In order to avoid making a complex
case even more complicated, the court severed the issue of
liability.' 8
The federal courts have also used the severance device to allevi-
ate delay of trials and congestion of court calendars. t9 In O'Donnell
v. Watson Brothers Transportation Co. ,2o Judge Miner, an outspoken
advocate of bifurcation,2' stated:
Delay causes hardship. Delay brings our courts into disre-
pute. Delay results in deterioration of evidence through loss of
witnesses, forgetful memories and death of parties and makes it
less likely that justice will be done when a case is reached for
trial. Delay effects settlements favorable to defendants because it
16. Id. at 203.
17. 197 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1952).
18. Id. at 772. See also Bvocik v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 277 F. Supp. 210 (E.D.
Wis. 1967), which involved complex liability and damages issues, several third-party defend-
ants, and, originally, 70 prospective witnesses. In granting the defendant's motion for a
separate trial on the issue of damages, the court stated, "The complexity of both the liability
and the damage issues warrants . . . the use of the separate trial device . . . . [Sleparate
trials will be conducive to expedition and economy." Id. at 211.
19. See, e.g., Mosley v. General Motors Corp., 497 F.2d 1329 (8th Cir. 1974); Hosie v.
Chicago & N.W. Ry., 282 F.2d 639 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961); Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 106 F. Supp. 561 (D. Del. 1952).
20. 183 F. Supp. 577 (N.D. 11. 1960). In this personal injury action, the court, on its
own motion, ordered a separate trial on the issue of liability. Following a jury verdict for
the plaintiff, the damages issue was continued by agreement of the parties so that the parties
could exhaust any settlement possibilities. The court approved this procedure since it elimi-
nated the need for a second trial.
21. Miner, Court Congestion: .4 New Approach, 45 A.B.A. J. 1265 (1959). Judge Miner
authored N.D. ILL. Civ. R. 21, which provides:
Pursuant to and in furtherance of Rule 42(b) Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, to curtail undue delay in the administration of justice in personal injury and
other civil litigation wherein the issue of liability may be adjudicated as a prerequi-
site to the determination of any or all other issues, in jury and non-jury cases, a
separate trial may be had upon such issue of liability, upon motion of any of the
parties or at the Court's direction, in any claim, cross-claim, counter-claim or
third-party claim.
In the event liability is sustained, the Court may recess for pretrial or settle-
ment conference or proceed with the trial on any or all of the remaining issues
before the Court; before the same jury or before another jury as conditions may
require and the Court shall deem met.
The Court, however, may proceed to trial upon all or any combination of
issues if, in its discretion, and in furtherance of justice, it shall appear that a sepa-
rate trial will work a hardship upon any of the parties or will result in a protracted
or costly litigation.
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slowly wears a claimant down and compels him to accept less
money as time goes on. This is a serious evil.22
In a slightly different context, separation has also been invoked
in instances in which it would save substantial time and expense in
litigation. 23 The convenience of the parties rather than the conven-
ience of the court appears to be the motivating factor.24 In connec-
tion with this proposition, an authoritative study was conducted for
the sole purpose of determining the amount of time actually saved
by separation of the issues. 25 The research revealed that the proce-
dure would save approximately twenty per cent of the time neces-
sary to try the cases in the traditional manner.26
Finally, split trials have been ordered to avoid prejudice to one
of the parties and to provide a just disposition of the case.27 In Moss
v. Associated Transport, Inc. ,28 the court recognized that the "para-
mount consideration at all times in the administration of justice is a
fair and impartial trial to all litigants. Considerations of economy
of time, money and convenience of witnesses must yield thereto. 29
Bifurcation, however, is not appropriate in every case. One of
the primary reasons is that the bifurcation procedure may result in a
22. 183 F. Supp. at 581. See also Kisteneffv. Tiernan, 514 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1975). It
became apparent that there would be a delay between the end of both parties' evidence on
liability and the jury's consideration of the issue because the plaintiff's medical expert would
be temporarily unavailable to testify. The court was concerned that such delay would im-
pair the jury's deliberations and thus ordered separate trials.
23. See, e.g., Rossano v. Blue Plate Foods, Inc., 314 F.2d 174 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 866 (1963); Molinaro v. Watkins-Johnson CEI Div., 60 F.R.D. 410 (D. Md. 1973);
LoCicero v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 52 F.R.D. 28 (E.D. La. 1971).
24. E.g., Rossano v. Blue Plate Foods, Inc., 314 F.2d 174, 176 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 866 (1963). The court was presented with an automobile negligence action which,
if determined in favor of the defendant, would "eliminate expense for all concerned .... "
Severance was ordered and upheld. See also LoCicero v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 52 F.R.D.
28, 30-31 (E.D. La. 1971). The court in LoCicero held that separation of issues "promises
convenience, potential economy, clearer jury understanding of the issues, less embracive
closing arguments, a shorter jury charge at each stage of the trial."
25. Zeisel & Callahan, Split Trials and Time Saving.: A StatisticalAnalysis, 76 HARV. L.
REV. 1606 (1963).
26. Id. at 1624.
27. See, e.g., Reading Indus. v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 61 F.R.D. 662 (S.D.N.Y.
1974); Lusk v. Pennzoil United, Inc., 56 F.R.D. 645 (N.D. Miss. 1972); Baker v. Waterman
S.S. Corp., 11 F.R.D. 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
28. 344 F.2d 23 (6th Cir. 1965).
29. Id. at 26 (citing Baker v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 11 F.R.D. 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1951)). See
also Nettles v. General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corp., 234 F.2d 243, 247 (5th Cir.
1956) (holding that the trial court, in trying the issue of liability separately from the issue of
damages, exercised proper discretion furthering convenience so long as no prejudice was
shown); Rossano v. Blue Plate Foods, Inc., 314 F.2d 174, 176 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 866 (1963).
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lawsuit being tried piecemeal. 30 Severance is also not appropriate in
a case in which the issues are so interwoven that a separate trial
would cause injustice.' Moreover, separation is denied when the
evidence is overlapping in order to avoid a duplication of witnesses'
testimony.32
A number of articles have been written in general opposition to
bifurcation.33 A common argument is that bifurcation substantially
changes the nature of the jury trial itself.34 The federal courts, how-
ever, do not appear to have been influenced by this line of thought.
In Hosie v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway,35 the plaintiff argued
that separation of the issues of liability and damages violated his
30. E.g., Eichinger v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 20 F.R.D. 204 (D. Neb. 1957). This was
an action by a grain elevator owner as plaintiff and by the owner of the stored grain as
plaintiff-intervenor, against the contractor who constructed the elevator and the insurors of
the elevator and its contents, for damages due to an explosion. The court refused to try first
the issue of liability, because separate trials would result in a duplication of evidence and
would hamper a just disposition of the case. The court stated:
[I]t may well be recognized that within the thought of the Rules as a whole,
and as a procedural charter, there is an impalpable suggestion that, in default of
controlling considerations to the contrary, a single submission of all the issues in a
civil action should be favored rather than their resolution in piecemeal trials.
Id. at 207. See also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 106 F. Supp. 561 (D. Del.
1952). (Under rule 42(b), "[ijssues should not be tried piecemeal unless necessary to prevent
undue delay or to promote the interests of justice").
31. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 286 F.2d 302 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 924
(1961). The lower court's decision to separate liability from damages was reversed because
the two issues were so interwoven. The plaintiffs were seeking exemplary damages which as
a matter of law, depended upon the degree of the defendant's liability. Neither could be
submitted to the jury independently without causing confusion and uncertainty. See also
Franchi Construction Co. v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 580 F.2d I (lst Cir. 1978). (An issue
should not be tried separately unless it is clearly so distinct and separable from other issues
that a separate trial will not cause an injustice). See also Hosie v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 282
F.2d 639 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961). (Question about injury had im-
portant bearing on question of liability).
32. Lusk v. Pennzoil United, Inc., 56 F.R.D. 645 (N.D. Miss 1972).
33. See, e.g., Weinstein, Routine Bifurcation of Jury Negligence Trials.- An Example of
the Questionable Use ofRule Making Power, 14 VAND. L. REV. 831 (1961); Note, Separation
of Issues of Liability and Damages in Personal Injury Cases- An Attempt to Combat Conges-
tion by Rule of Court, 46 IowA L. REV. 815 (1961); Note, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-
Severability of Issues-Do Separate Trials of Issues of Liability and Damages Violate the
Seventh Amendment, 36 NOTRE DAME LAW. 388 (1961); Note, Separate Trial of a Claim or
Issue in Modem Pleading. Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 MINN. L.
REV. 743, 760-61 (1955).
34. See, e.g., 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2390,
at 299 (1971); Comment, Implications of Bifurcation in the Ordinary Negligence Case, 26 U.
PiTr. L. REV. 99, 105-10 (1964); Weinstein, Routine Bifurcation of Jury Negligence Trials.- An
Example of the Questionable Use of Rule Making Power, 14 VAND. L. REV. 831, 832-35
(1961).
35. 282 F.2d 639 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961).
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fundamental right to a trial by jury.36 In response to the plaintiffs
constitutional argument, the appellate court stated that "[t]he Sev-
enth Amendment does not require the retention of all the old forms
of procedure; nor does it prohibit the introduction of new methods
for ascertaining what facts are in issue." 7
Another controversial issue is whether rule 42(b) contemplates
the use of the same jury for both trials, or whether a different jury
may be used for each trial.38 If severance of liability and damages
requires the use of two juries, a substantial amount of the time saved
by separation might be consumed in impaneling juries. Moreover,
this again raises doubts concerning the seventh amendment right to
a trial by.jury. 39 Although the United States Supreme Court has not
ruled directly on this question, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit has addressed the problem. In O'Donnell v.
Watson Brothers Transportation Co. ,4 the court expressed the view
that although the "better and preferred practice is to submit the
damage issue to the same jury which has decided the liability is-
sue,"41 separate juries may be used if the procedure "does not work
a hardship upon any of the litigants, does not result in unwarranted
protracted litigation, and does not unduly increase the costs of
suit." 4
2
The propriety of bifurcation in any given case is within the trial
36. Id. at 642. U.S. CONST. amend. VII provides: "In suits at common law, where the
value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved,
and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of the United States,
than according to the rules of the common law."
37. 282 F.2d at 643. The court cited Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Ref. Co., 283
U.S. 494 (1931), in which the Supreme Court in effect sanctioned the bifurcation of issues
when it remanded a case for trial on the issue of damages only. This necessarily required
determination of liability by one jury and fixation of damages by another jury.
38. Eg., United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 286 F.2d 302 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S.
924 (1961); O'Donnell v. Watson Bros. Transp., 183 F. Supp. 577 (N.D. Ill. 1960).
39. E.g., Hosie v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 282 F.2d 639 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365
U.S. 814 (1961); Alabama v. Blue Bird Body Co., 71 F.R.D. 606 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
40. 183 F. Supp. 577 (N.D. Ill. 1960).
41. Id. at 580. Seegeneraly Hosie v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 282 F.2d 639, 643 (7th Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961) (The court discussed this proposition but did not pass
on it.).
42. O'Donnell v. Watson Bros. Transp., 183 F. Supp. 577, 581 (N.D. Ill. 1960); see also
Driver v. Phillips, 36 F.R.D. 261 (E.D. Pa. 1964) (Separate trials of the issues of liability and
damages before the same or different juries may be ordered in an appropriate case because it
will save the time of the court and will facilitate the possibility of settlement after the liabil-
ity trial. Ordinarily, the damage issue should be tried to the same jury that decided the
liability issue.); United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 286 F.2d 302 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366
U.S. 924 (1961) (when issues of liability and damages are interwoven, separate juries should
not be ordered).
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court's sound discretion.43 It does not necessarily depend upon the
wishes of the parties, since the courts occasionally order a separate
trial over the objection of both parties. 44 The courts, however, have
consistently held that the judge should exercise informed discretion
and should not make a "wholesale" application of the bifurcation
procedure. 45 Furthermore, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules
did not intend indiscriminate utilization but rather cautioned that
bifurcation "is not to be routinely ordered," but to "be encouraged
where experience has demonstrated its worth. ' 46 Perhaps the best
discussion of why discretion must be exercised is found in Lis v.
Robert Packer Hospital:47
[T]he rule in this circuit since 1972 has been that the decision
to bifurcate ve? non is a matter to be decided on a case-by-case
basis and must be subject to an informed discretion by the trial
judge in each instance. . . .A general policy of a district judge
bifurcating all negligence cases offends the philosophy that a de-
cision must be made by a trial judge only as a result of an in-
formed exercise of discretion on the merits of each case.48
The importance of the manner in which the court exercises its dis-
cretion lies in the rule that, absent an abuse of discretion, a trial
court's judgment will not be overturned on appeal.49
The application by the states of a rule the same as or similar to
federal rule 42(b) has received varied treatment. Many jurisdictions
have followed the federal lead and adopted the bifurcation proce-
dure by rule or statute.50 Of these jurisdictions, a number have de-
43. Eg., Moss v. Associated Transp., Inc., 344 F.2d 23 (6th Cir. 1965). (Under rule
42(b) the ordering of separate trials on the issues of liability and damages is within the sound
discretion of the trial judge.) See also Mosley v. General Motors Corp., 497 F.2d 1330, 1332
(8th Cir. 1974) ("Rule 42(b) vest[s] in the district court the discretion to order separate trials
or make such other orders as will prevent delay or prejudice."); Idzojtic v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 456 F.2d 1228, 1230 (3rd Cir. 1972) ("The district court is given broad discretion in
reaching its decision whether to separate the issues of liability and damages.").
44. E.g., Hosie v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 282 F.2d 639, 642 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
365 U.S. 814 (1961).
45. See, e.g., Moss v. Associated Transp., Inc., 344 F.2d 23, 26 (6th Cir. 1965); Frasier v.
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 119 F. Supp. 495, 497 (D. Neb. 1954); Molinaro v.
Watkins-Johnson CEI Div., 60 F.R.D. 410, 413 (D. Md. 1973).
46. Advisory Committee Note to the 1966 Amendment of Rule 42(b), 39 F.R.D. 113.
47. 579 F.2d 819 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978).
48. Id. at 824. See also Note, Separate Trial of a Claim or Issue in Modem Pleading:
Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 MINN. L. REV. 743, 760-61 (1955).
49. Eg., Nettles v. General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corp., 234 F.2d 243 (5th
Cir. 1956).
50. ALA. R. Civ. P. 42(b); ALASKA R. CT. 42(b); ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 42(b); CAL. CIV. PRO.
CODE § 598 (West 1976 & Supp. 1982) (specifically provides for split trial on liability); CAL.
[Vol. 5:405
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termined bifurcation proper in a manner consistent with federal
precedent.5 1 Several of the jurisdictions, however, have taken a
more conservative approach to use of the procedure than that taken
by the federal courts,52 and at least one state has completely refused
to utilize rule 42(b) in its rules of civil procedure.53 Many states
have apparently not had an occasion to apply the rule in this re-
gard. 4 A few states simply have no statute or case law authorizing
bifurcation." Finally, two states' statutes so clearly provide for split
trials that no case law exists on this issue.56
CtV. PRO. CODE § 1048(b) (West 1980); COLO. R. Civ. P. 42(b); DEL. SUPER. CT. Civ. R.
42(b); FLA. R. CIv. P. 1.270(b); GA. CODE ANN. § 81A-142(b) (1977); IDAHO R. Civ. P.
42(b); KAN. CIV. PRO. STAT. CODE ANN. § 60-242(b) (1976); Ky. R. Civ. P. 42.02; ME. R.
Civ. P. 42(b); MD. R. P. § 501(a); MASS. R. Civ. P. 42(b); MICH. GEN. CT. R. 505.2; MINN.
R. Civ. P. 42.02; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 510.180(2) (Vernon 1952); MONT. R. Civ. P. 42(b); NEV.
R. Civ. P. 42(b); N.J. RUL. 4:38.2 (specifically provides for split trial); N.M. R. CIv. P. FOR
DIST. CT. 42(b); N.Y. Civ. PnAc. LAW § 603 (McKinney 1976); N.C. R. Civ. P. 42(b); N.D.
R. Ctv. P. 42(b); OHIO R. Civ. P. 42(b); OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. XII § 323 (West Supp. 1981);
OR. R. Civ. P. 53(b); PA. R. Civ. P. 213(b); R.I. R. Civ. P. 42.02; S.D. COMp. LAWS ANN.
§ 15-6-42(b) (1967 & Supp. 1981); TENN. R. Civ. P. 42(b) (only when non-jury); TEX. R.
Civ. P. 174(b); UTAH R. Civ. P. 42(b); VT. R. Civ. P. 42(b); VA. CODE § 8.01-281(b) (1977 &
Supp. 1982) (only on motion of party); WASH. CT. R. 42(b); W. VA. R. Civ. P. 42(c); Wyo.
R. Civ. P. 42(b).
51. Coburn v. American Liberty Ins. Co., 341 So. 2d 717 (Ala. 1977); Woods v. Harker,
22 Ariz. App. 83, 523 P.2d 1320 (1974); Watts v. Mantooth, 196 So. 2d 230 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1967); Cline v. Kehs, 148 Ga. App. 350, 246 S.E.2d 329 (1978); Tilley v. International
Harvester Co., 208 Kan. 75, 490 P.2d 392 (1971); Heiserman v. Baltimore & A.R.R., 15 Md.
App. 657, 292 A.2d 140 (1972); State ex rel. Blond v. Stubbs, 485 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. Ct. App.
1972); Culley v. City of N.Y., 25 A.D.2d 519, 267 N.Y.S.2d 282 (1966); Vander Veer v.
Toyota Motor Distribs., 282 Or. 135, 577 P.2d 1343 (1978); Brown v. General Motors Corp.,
67 Wash. 2d 278, 407 P.2d 461 (1965).
52. Randolph v. Scott, 338 A.2d 135 (Del. Super Ct. 1975) (Rule 42(b) does not envision
routine separation of liability and damages); Arnold v. Dirrim, 198 N.E.2d 426 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1979) (The court found the policy of the law is to limit the number of trials when
possible and thus denied bifurcation); Peasley v. Quinn, 373 Mich. 222, 128 N.W.2d 515
(1964) (The mere expectation of saving time does not justify bifurcation); Heidbreder v.
Northhampton Township Trustees, 64 Ohio App. 2d 95, 411 N.E.2d 825 (1979) (The trial
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to order bifurcation, even though testimony
concerning injuries may have influenced the jury); Fields v. Volkswagon of Am., 555 P.2d 48
(Okla. 1976) (Bifurcation was approved when both parties agreed to it).
53. Eubanks v. Winn, 420 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. 1967); Iley v. Hughes, 158 Tex. 362, 311
S.W.2d 648 (1956).
54. These states include Alaska, Colorado, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
55. These states are Connecticut, Hawaii, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, South Carolina, Wisconsin, and Illinois. Illinois presents an interesting con-
trast, in that the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois has
adopted a bifurcation rule that almost requires a separate trial for liability. See supra text
accompanying note 20.
56. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE, § 598 (West 1976 & Supp. 1982); N.J. RULE 4:38-2.
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In Hunter v. McDaniel Brothers Construction Co. ,- the Arkan-
sas Supreme Court relied heavily on federal precedent in reaching
its decision. The court rejected the appellants' arguments that bifur-
cation constituted an infringement upon the right to a jury trial.58
The court noted that rule 42(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure was virtually identical to rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and adopted the federal application of rule 42(b).59
The court found little merit in the appellants' argument that the
facts presented interwoven issues of liability and damages. The ap-
pellants argued that since they were required to prove the existence
of damages in order to establish liability, they should have been al-
lowed to prove the existence of damages through the introduction of
photographs of the vehicles involved in the accident and through
testimony concerning the position of Michael and Patty Crosno af-
ter impact.60 The court further found that liability in the case was
not dependent on the nature of the damages suffered, but rather was
totally unrelated to the damages.6 1
Of greater significance was the court's rejection of the appel-
lants' final argument, which was an alleged abuse of discretion by
the trial court in its application of rule 42(b).62 The court stated that
even a vehicular collision case is appropriate for a bifurcated trial,
provided that the bifurcation furthers convenience, avoids delay and
prejudice, and serves the needs of justice.63 According to the court,
the primary concern of rule 42(b) should be efficient judicial admin-
istration, not the wishes of the parties, provided no prejudice is suf-
fered.64 The court tempered this rule with the requirement that rule
42(b) be applied on a case-by-case basis through the exercise of in-
formed discretion, 61 and further stated that routine bifurcation
would likely constitute an abuse of discretion.66
Hunter elicited a vigorous dissent from Justice Purtle, joined by
57. 274 Ark. 178, 623 S.W.2d 196 (1981).
58. Id. (citing Hosie v. Chicago and N.W. Ry., 282 F.2d 639 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. de-
nied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961) and C. WRIGHT, LAW OF THE FEDERAL COURTS § 97, at 433-34
(2d ed. 1970)).
59. 274 Ark, at 180, 623 S.W.2d at 198.
60. Id.
61. Id. (citing Hosie v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 282 F.2d 639 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
365 U.S. 814 (1961)).
62. Id. at 181, 623 S.W.2d at 199.
63. Id. at 181, 623 S.W.2d at 198.
64. Id.
65. Id. (citing Lis v. Robert Packer Hosp., 579 F.2d 819 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
955 (1978).
66. Id. at 181, 623 S.W.2d at 199.
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Chief Justice Adkisson and Justice Hays.67 The dissenters stated
that this bifurcation denied the appellants their right to a jury trial
and, further, that the bifurcation of different issues in a single trial
was not authorized by rule 42(b). 68 The dissent was particularly
concerned with the fact that the jury never considered the damages
of the plaintiffs. Allowing the jury to decide liability first, reasoned
the dissent, encouraged a finding for the defendant in order to save
the necessity of a second trial on the issue of damages. 69 The dis-
senters were also troubled by the trial court's initiation of the bifur-
cation procedure, stating that bifurcation should occur only with the
consent of the parties. 7
0
The time for serious argument against bifurcation of liability
and damages in Arkansas is past. With the decision in Hunter bifur-
cation is now firmly entrenched in Arkansas civil procedure.
Unfortunately, Hunter leaves a number of unanswered ques-
tions. For instance, the court clearly indicated that the trial court
should exercise "informed discretion" in the application of rule
42(b),71 citing Lis v. Robert Packer Hospital.7 2 Yet from a preceden-
tial standpoint, the court's reasoning in Hunter does not provide the
necessary essentials of such "informed discretion." The question
whether the trial court abused its discretion was clearly presented 73
but not clearly answered. While the court did state in general terms
the purpose of rule 42(b), it did not state that the bifurcation in
Hunter was necessary to avoid prejudice, 74 to save time and expense
67. Id. at 183, 623 S.W.2d at 200 (Purtle, J. dissenting).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 184, 623 S.W.2d at 200.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 181, 623 S.W.2d at 198.
72. 579 F.2d 819 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978). See supra text accompany-
ing note 47.
73. 274 Ark. at 181, 623 S.W.2d at 198. The question of informed discretion has been
presented in other jurisdictions and has been answered in a more informative and preceden-
tial manner. For instance, in Randolph v. Scott, 338 A.2d 135 (Del. Super Ct. 1975), the
court declined to grant the defendant's motion for separate trials on the issues of liability
and damages. However, the court enumerated situations in which bifurcation would be
proper, thus providing future guidelines. In Brown v. General Motors Corp., 67 Wash. 2d
278, 407 P.2d 461 (1965), the trial court's severance was permitted to stand. The appellate
court clearly set forth its rationale in upholding bifurcation. See also Coburn v. American
Liberty Ins. Co., 341 So. 2d 717 (Ala. 1977); Peasley v. Quinn, 373 Mich. 222, 128 N.W.2d
515 (1964); Vander Veer v. Toyota Motor Distribs., 282 Or. 135, 577 P.2d 1343 (1978).
74. Eg., Moss v. Associated Transp., Inc., 344 F.2d 23, 26 (6th Cir. 1965).
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in litigation, 75 to provide for the convenience of the parties, 76 wit-
nesses, 7 or trial court,78 or to simplify the presentation of issues in a
complex case. 79 In a round-about way the court stated that routine
bifurcation would constitute an abuse of discretion. 0 Perplexingly,
the court did not indicate why the trial court's bifurcation was any-
thing other than routine.8 '
Equally troublesome is the fact that the trial court was permit-
ted to order a bifurcation on its own motion.8 2 As pointed out in the
dissent, there is nothing in rule 42(b) that explicitly allows the trial
court to take upon itself the decision of whether the issue of liability
should be tried separately. 83 In a judicial system based on two-party
advocacy, it would seem best to leave the initiation of bifurcation to
the parties.
The court was not faced with the issue of whether the same jury
would have to try both the issue of liability and the issue of dam-
ages. No doubt at some point it will be given the opportunity to
pass upon this facet of bifurcation.
Hunter will undoubtedly catch the eye of many personal injury
attorneys in Arkansas. The decision ushers in a new era in personal
injury litigation. Gone is the potential to shore up weak liability
cases with sympathy-invoking injuries. Tradition has been sacri-
ficed in the interest of judicial economy.
Margaret Mayfield Gammill
75. E.g., Rossano v. Blue Plate Foods, Inc., 314 F.2d 174, 176 (5th Cir.), ceri. denied,
375 U.S. 866 (1963); Fields v. Volkswagon of Am., 555 P.2d 48, 54 (Okla. 1976).
76. E.g., LoCicero v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 52 F.R.D. 28, 30 (E.D. La. 1971); Watts v.
Mantooth, 196 So. 2d 230, 232 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
77. E.g., Watts v. Mantooth, 196 So. 2d 230, 232 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
78. E.g., O'Donnell v. Watson Bros. Transp., 183 F. Supp. 577, 581 (N.D. In. 1960);
Brown v. General Motors Corp., 67 Wash. 2d 278, 407 P.2d 461, 464 (1965).
79. E.g., In re Texas City Disaster Litigation, 197 F.2d 771, 772 (5th Cir. 1952), ald sub
nom. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953); Richenbacher Transp., Inc. v. Penn-
sylvania R.R., 3 F.R.D. 202, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Coburn v. American Liberty Ins. Co., 341
So. 2d 717, 718 (Ala. 1977).
80. 274 Ark. at 181, 623 S.W.2d at 199.
81. Id.
82. At least two other jurisdictions appear to have permitted severance on the court's
own motion. Cline v. Kehs, 146 Ga. App. 350, 246 S.E.2d 329 (1978); Watts v. Mantooth,
196 So. 2d 230 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967). But cf. Fields v. Volkswagon of Am., 555 P.2d 48
(Okla. 1976) (in which bifurcation was permitted upon agreement of both parties).
83. 274 Ark. at 184, 623 S.W.2d at 200.
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